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Abstract
This chapter argues that olfactory experiences represent either everyday
objects or ad hoc olfactory objects as having primitive olfactory properties,
which happen to be uninstantiated. On this picture, olfactory experiences
reliably misrepresent: they falsely represent everyday objects or ad hoc
objects as having properties they do not have, and they misrepresent in
the same way on multiple occasions. One might worry that this view
is incompatible with the plausible claim that olfactory experiences at
least sometimes justify true beliefs about the world. This chapter argues
that there is no such incompatibility. Since olfactory experiences reliably
misrepresent, they can lead to true and justified beliefs about putatively
smelly objects.
Keywords: olfactory experience, olfaction, experience, justification, belief, mis-
representation, reliable misrepresentation, intentionality, content
∗Forthcoming in Berit Brogaard and Dimitria Gatzia (eds.), The Rational Roles of Percep-
tual Experience: Beyond Vision. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
1
1 Introduction
Olfactory experiences are the experiences we have when we do what we commonly
call “smelling.” For example, when we smell a burning piece of toast, a wet dog,
the smoke outside our window, or the sour milk, we have olfactory experiences.
This chapter is about olfactory experiences, their contents, and how they justify
beliefs, such as beliefs about burning toast, wet dogs, and sour milk.
I will argue that olfactory experiences have contents (section 2). They
represent everyday objects or ad hoc “bare olfactory objects” as having primitive
olfactory properties (subsections 3.1–3.2). Olfactory properties happen never
to be instantiated, so olfactory experiences misrepresent the world around us.
However, I will argue, since olfactory experiences misrepresent in the same way
on distinct occasions, they reliably misrepresent. This provides the basis for an
explanation of how, despite misrepresenting, olfactory experiences can not only
be useful, but also justify true beliefs about putatively smelly objects (section 4).
Before beginning, a brief note about terminology is in order: it is useful
to have a fairly neutral and everyday way of describing olfactory experiences
without presupposing any particular view of whether they have contents or of
what they represent. I will reserve the term “smell” for this use, using it to stand
for an act, a property, or an object, depending on context. For instance, we can
say that we smell the roses, that the roses smell nice, that the roses have a nice
smell, or that we notice a nice smell. “Smell” talk is neutral on the contents
of the states described. For example, saying that Eleni smells the roses does
not imply any particular view of the content of her state or even that she has a
corresponding contentful state at all.
2 Olfactory Experiences Have contents
Before considering the question of what particular contents olfactory experiences
represent, let us first motivate the view that they do represent. This view
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has received much explicit endorsement (see especially Perkins 1983, Lycan
1996, 2000, Matthen 2005, Batty 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d, Richardson
2013, Budek and Farkas 2014, Mizrahi 2014, Roberts 2015, Cavedon-Taylor
forthcoming), but it has at least a few detractors (Reid 2002, Peacocke 1983)
and Lycan (1996) argues it is far from obvious.
There are various ways of elucidating the notion of content at play here. My
favored way is ostensive, relying on introspectively accessible paradigm examples
of contentful states, such as thoughts and certain perceptual experiences. For
example, thoughts and perceptual experiences, such as visual experiences, seem
to “say,” or be “of” or “about,” certain things. For example, a thought that
the cat is on the mat might “say” that the cat is on the mat or be “about” the
proposition that the cat is on the mat, and a visual experience of a red cup
might be “of” or “about” a (putative) red cup or the (putative) fact that there
is a red cup. The foregoing mental states are examples of intentional mental
states, and what they “say,” are “of” or “about,” or, more generally, represent,
are their contents.1
I will now motivate the claim that olfactory experiences have contents. I will
do so by outlining two key reasons for thinking that visual and other experiences
have contents and arguing that they also apply to olfactory experiences.
That visual experiences, and many other kinds of experiences, are intentional
has been argued on phenomenological grounds. Many visual and other experi-
ences seem to present, represent, or “tell us” something. For example, a visual
experience of a blue cup seems to represent a cup and a blueness that qualifies
the cup, which suggests that it in fact represents a cup or cup-shaped object as
1Note that although our paradigm cases of intentionality are introspectively accessible
mental states, this does not mean that all cases of intentionality must be introspectively
accessible or that they must be mental states. There might be introspectively inaccessible or
non-mental states with the same feature as our paradigm cases that are not introspectively
accessible. Notice also that my definition does not make reference to conditions of truth or
reference. This is because that there are such things as conditions of truth or reference is a
substantive further claim about the nature of intentionality (see Mendelovici 2018a, Ch. 1).
However, for the purposes of my discussion, I will assume that intentional states have conditions
of truth or reference.
For a more precise ostensive definition of intentionality, see Mendelovici 2018a, 2010,
forthcominga, and Kriegel 2011.
3
being blue.2 In the same way, olfactory experiences seem to represent objects,
such as putatively smelly objects, and qualities that seem to qualify them. For
example, an olfactory experience of a basil leaf seems to represent the basil leaf
and a basil-y smell that qualifies the basil leaf, which suggests that the olfactory
experience represents the basil leaf as having certain olfactory properties. Even
olfactory experiences that do not seem to present any everyday objects, such as
an experience of a foul smell with an unknown source, seem to tell us something
about the world, even if it is simply that there is a smell present. So even these
kinds of olfactory experiences seem to have contents.
That visual and other experiences have contents has also been argued on
epistemological grounds: McDowell (1994) roughly argues that experiences have
contents because they justify beliefs and, in order for them to do so, they must
have contents. For instance, a perceptual experience of a blue cup before you
might all by itself justify the belief that there is a blue cup before you. It is
unclear how the perceptual experience can by itself justify the belief if it were a
mere sensation or other non-intentional state. But if the perceptual experience
has a content like <there is a blue cup before me>, it can justify a belief with
this or related contents in the same way that a belief can justify another belief
with a related content. Similarly, an olfactory experience of a basil leaf by itself
justifies the belief that the basil leaf has a certain smell. This suggests that the
experience represents the basil leaf as having particular olfactory properties.
3 The Contents of Olfactory Experiences
In the previous section, I motivated the idea that olfactory experiences have
contents. But what exactly do they represent? Since olfactory experiences
generally represent (putative) objects as (putatively) having various properties,
2Such arguments are often made by representationalists, who take phenomenal consciousness
to be a species of intentionality. See Harman 1990, Lycan 1996, Dretske 1995, Tye 2000,
Mendelovici 2013a, 2013b, 2018a, Bourget and Mendelovici 2014, and Bourget 2015, 2017a,
2017b.
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the question can be divided into two more specific questions, which I will address
in the following two subsections:
1. What are the objects represented by olfactory experiences? (Section 3.1)
2. What are the properties represented by olfactory experiences? (Section
3.2)
Although much of the literature on the contents of olfactory experiences focuses
on the first question, I will focus on the second question, since it is the answer
to that question that compels us to say that olfactory experiences generally
misrepresent. However, it is still useful to briefly address the first question in
order to attain a more complete picture of the contents of olfactory experiences.
Before we begin, it is helpful to clarify the notions of represented objects
and represented properties at play: I will take a represented property to be a
content that can qualify other contents, and a represented object to be a content
that can be qualified by other contents. For example, a visual experience of
a blue ball represents a represented object, such as <the ball>, and various
represented properties, such as <blueness> and <roundness>, which qualify
<the ball>. Importantly, we can accept that visual experiences represent both
objects and properties without requiring that represented objects are, contain,
or otherwise involve externally existing objects, such as concrete externally
existing balls or that represented properties are, contain, or otherwise involve
universals, or other items that might be identified with properties. The distinction
between represented objects and represented properties is a superficial distinction
between the roles that contents play, not a metaphysical one concerning their
deep natures.3
3Mendelovici 2018b and 2018a, Ch. 1 make a distinction between the deep natures and the
superficial characters of contents. Mendelovici 2018b argues that the debate over proposition-
alism is best construed as a debate over the superficial characters of contents. The notions
of represented objects and represented properties operative in this chapter pertain to the
superficial character of contents, not their deep natures.
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3.1 The Objects Represented by Olfactory Experiences
There are various views of the objects represented by olfactory experiences.
One option is to say that olfactory experiences represent everyday objects, like
cakes, roses, and burning pieces of toast. Another option is to say that olfactory
experiences represent odors, which might be taken to be collections of airborne
molecules (Richardson 2013, Cavedon-Tayler forthcoming). Another option is
that an olfactory experience represents some object as having olfactory properties,
but no particular object (Batty 2010a). Yet another option is that olfactory
objects are the “stuffs” that everyday objects are composed of, rather than
the everyday objects themselves (Mizrahi 2014). Sometimes these options are
combined: Lycan (1996) claims that every olfactory experience has two olfactory
objects, an odor and an everyday object, while Budek and Farkas (2014) take
some olfactory experiences to represent odors and others to represent odors as
well as the everyday objects that are their sources. I favor a different combined
view on which some olfactory experiences represent everyday objects, while
others represent “bare olfactory objects,” which are ad hoc objects whose sole
purpose is to be the bearers of olfactory properties.
Any of these views of olfactory objects is compatible with the main points of
this chapter. However, in order to develop a full view of the contents of olfactory
experience, I will briefly present and overview the motivations for my favored
view of olfactory objects, which is defended in greater detail in Mendelovici MS.
My favored view, on which there are two different types of olfactory expe-
riences that differ in their represented objects, can be motivated by a pair of
everyday phenomenological observations: First, sometimes we experience objects
as having smells, as when a basil leaf smells basil-y. Second, sometimes smells
seem to take on a life of their own, leaving their sources far behind, as when the
smell of a baking cake travels through the house and out the window.
The first phenomenological observation is that we at least sometimes experi-
ence objects as having smells. When we sniff a basil leaf, it seems that it is the
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basil leaf itself that smells basil-y, and when we smell a rose, it seems that the
rose itself has a certain sweet, flowery smell. Our olfactory experiences seem to
tell us about features of the basil leaf and rose themselves. Taken at face value,
such cases suggest that the objects represented by olfactory experiences are at
least sometimes everyday objects like basil leaves and roses.
The case of multimodal experiences involving olfactory components also
supports the view that the represented objects of olfactory experiences are at
least sometimes everyday objects. A multimodal experience of a halved orange
might involve visual, tactile, and olfactory experiences representing the halved
orange as having various properties, such as being orange, having a particular
size, shape, and texture, and having an orangey citrusy smell. These properties
are all represented as being properties of the same object. Since the properties of
the visual and tactile components of the experience are represented as properties
of the halved orange, the object of the olfactory component of the experience is
also the halved orange.
One objection to the view that some olfactory experiences represent everyday
objects is that we cannot always discriminate between different scenarios in which
different everyday objects are causing our olfactory experiences. Batty (2010d,
2011) raises such an objection, arguing that we cannot tell from our olfactory
experience alone whether a kitchen is completely filled with air freshener, or
whether a spot above the sink was missed. However, that we cannot discriminate
between two scenarios does not mean that we do not represent one or the other
as obtaining. In the case of vision, stimuli reaching our retinas are massively
ambiguous in that there are multiple visual scenes that can cause them (see
Marr 1982). The visual system does not simply fail to see in cases where it
cannot discriminate between different possibilities, but instead makes various
“assumptions” about what the visible world is like and uses them to resolve the
ambiguity. This shows that, in general, not being able to discriminate between
a set of possibilities does not prevent us from representing one of them.
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Our second introspective observation is that in some cases it seems that
smells can take on a life of their own, travel through space, and leave their
sources far behind. The baking cake’s smell wafts around the room, fills the
whole house, and goes out the window. The wet dog’s smell lingers in the foyer,
long after the wet dog has gone. Even though one knows what is the source of
the smell, one’s olfactory experience seems to represent the smell as existing
distinctly, independently of its source. The intuition is clearer in cases where
the source of a smell is unknown, as in an example offered by Budek and Farkas
(2014) in which you enter a room and are greeted by an unexpected smell. In
this case, you do not represent a particular everyday object as having the smell.
You just smell the smell. We can call such olfactory experiences lone smell
experiences.
Taken at face value, lone smell experiences suggest that at least some olfactory
experiences represent something that can exist independently from everyday
objects like cakes and roses and that is the bearer of olfactory properties.
Whatever these things are, they may be experienced as causally originating from
particular everyday objects, as in the case of the baking cake, or they may not,
as in the case of the unexpected smell.
Some views of the objects of lone smell experiences take them to be odors
(collections of airborne molecules), spatial locations, or portions of air. The
problem with these views is that they receive little phenomenological support.
Olfactory experiences do not seem to represent the objects of lone smell ex-
periences as having a molecular constitution, so their objects are not odors.
Lone smell experiences do not represent portions of space as being smelly—it is
not as if space itself seems to bear the smell—so their objects are not spatial
locations. And lone smell experiences can represent smells as moving through
the air without representing the air itself as moving, so their objects are not
portions of air. (These arguments are fleshed out in Mendelovici MS.)
My suggestion, instead, is that the objects of lone smell experiences are bare
8
olfactory objects, objects that are represented as having no properties other than
olfactory properties and locations. When we represent a lone smell, we create
an ad hoc representation of an object that plays the role of being the bearer of
the relevant olfactory properties. These bare olfactory objects are the objects
that we commonly call “smells,” as in when we say that there is a smell in the
foyer, or that the cake’s smell is wafting out the window.
Before continuing, it is worth considering another alternative view of lone
smell experiences, some versions of which are not compatible with my claim in
section 4 that olfactory experiences are systematically false: the view that lone
smell experiences do not represent any objects at all but instead represent mere
olfactory properties (and hence cannot be true or false). In Mendelovici 2013a,
2013b, I argue for a similar view of mood experiences on which they represent
mere affective properties, such as elatedness and sadness. However, there is
a key difference between the two cases that make moods, but not lone smell
experiences, amenable to such treatment. For one, moods do not seem to tell
us about how the world is. In contrast, even though lone smell experiences do
not tell us about the sources of lone smells, they do tell us something about how
the world is. At the very least, they tell us that there is a smell, whatever this
amounts to. This suggests that lone smell experiences, but not moods, have
propositional contents.
Another important difference between the two cases is that lone smell expe-
riences, but not moods, present whatever qualities they present as existing in
space. Since it doesn’t make sense to represent universal properties as existing
in space, this suggests that lone smell experiences, unlike moods, represent their
properties as instantiated.
One might suggest an alternative version of the proprietal content view on
which what olfactory experiences represent is not mere olfactory proprieties but
rather olfactory properties as being instantiated. Now, in perceptual experience,
the way that we generally represent the instantiation of properties is by binding
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them to represented objects. So, we represent contents of the form <o is
F>, rather than <F is instantiated>, the latter of which does not involve
the representation of an object. This makes sense, since it is arguably less
demanding to perceptually represent <o is F> than it is to perceptual represent
<F is instantiated>; the latter content, but not the former, requires a special
representation of instantiation, which requires either a concept of instantiation
or a special non-conceptual representation of instantiation. So, we might expect
that lone smell experiences, which can be had by relatively unsophisticated
thinkers such as young children, have the form <o is F and at L> rather than <F
is instantiated at L>. But then we end up with my favored view, the view that
lone smell experiences represent ad hoc objects as having olfactory properties,
rather than a view on which they represent the mere instantiation of olfactory
properties.
In summary, olfactory experiences represent either everyday objects or bare
olfactory objects as having olfactory properties.
3.2 What Properties Do Olfactory Experiences Represent?
Let us now turn to the question of what olfactory properties are, that is, of what
are the properties represented by olfactory experience.
As Batty (2010b) notes, the options here correspond to the options in the
debate on the contents of perceptual color experiences. Here are three main
options:
Physicalism: Olfactory properties are mind-independent physical properties of
olfactory objects, such as molecular properties.
Relationalism: Olfactory properties are relations between olfactory objects
and minds, such as dispositions to cause certain kinds of mental states in
subjects.
Primitivism: Olfactory properties are primitive properties.
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I will argue in favor of primitivism about olfactory properties. The problem with
the alternative physicalist and relationalist views is that there is a mismatch
between the contents they ascribe to olfactory experiences and the contents
supported by pre-theoretic considerations, considerations that are independent
of any theories of intentionality or views of the particular contents of particular
states. This problem is the mismatch problem. Primitivism, in contrast, ascribes
contents that are supported by pre-theoretic considerations. The argument
presented here is a special case of a general form of argument from the mismatch
problem, which I’ve developed elsewhere in greater detail.4
Let us consider physicalism. According to physicalism, olfactory properties
are mind-independent physical properties that are represented as being had by
olfactory objects. One natural physicalist view is that these properties are the
molecular properties that are the categorical bases of smelly objects’ dispositions
to cause olfactory experiences in us.
The problem with this view is that pre-theoretic introspective and epistemo-
logical considerations tell against it. What we introspectively notice when we
smell a halved orange is not a particular configuration of molecules or some other
related physical property. Such properties form no part of our phenomenology.
This is evidenced by the fact that we cannot tell through introspection alone
which particular molecular or other physical properties particular smells are, or
even that smells are molecular or other kinds of physical properties. Instead,
what we introspectively notice when we introspect on our olfactory experience
of the halved orange is a sweet, tangy, and orangey smell. This intangible and
difficult-to-describe smell is nowhere to be found in the molecular properties
4See Mendelovici 2018a for arguments against tracking theories of mental representation
based on actual mismatch cases, Mendelovici 2013c and 2016 for arguments against tracking
theories based on the possibility of mismatch cases, Bourget and Mendelovici 2014 and
forthminga overviews of the mismatch problem, and Mendelovici 2013b for an application of
the mismatch problem to the case of moods and emotions and. See also Pautz 2006, 2013
for the structural mismatch problem for tracking representationalism, which is the problem
of there being a mismatch in the relations of similarity and difference between what a set of
representations represent and the relations of similarity and difference between the items that
they track. See Mendelovici and Bourget Mendelovici and Bourget 2019 and forthmingb for
discussion of the application of both kinds of mismatch problem to Karen Neander’s (2017)
theory of mental representation.
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or other physical properties that the physicalist might identify with olfactory
properties. In short, the contents ascribed by physicalism do not match the
contents supported by introspective considerations.
Our epistemological situation provides further considerations against physi-
calism: from olfactory experiences alone, we are not justified in inferring that
olfactory objects have or involve certain molecular properties or other kinds
of physical properties. Such inferences would involve a leap, going beyond the
evidence provided by our olfactory experiences. But if olfactory experiences
did represent the relevant physical properties, then we should be justified in
making such inferences on the basis of olfactory experience alone. In contrast, it
seems we are justified in believing that olfactory objects represent difficult-to-
describe smells like the sweet, tangy, and orangey smell mentioned above. In
sum, the contents ascribed by physicalism do not match the contents supported
by epistemological considerations.
There are two parts to the mismatch problem: First, the physicalist view
attributes contents to olfactory experiences that they do not have, namely
contents having to do with molecular properties or other physical properties.
This is an error of commission, since the problem is that physicalism includes
material in the content of olfactory experiences that it is inappropriate to include.
Second, the physicalist view fails to attribute contents to olfactory experiences
that they do in fact have, such as the sweet, tangy, and orangey smell involved
in the olfactory experience of an orange. This is an error of omission, since
the problem is that the physicalist’s description of the content of olfactory
experiences inappropriately leaves something out. Both problems show that the
physicalist view delivers the wrong answers: the properties physicalism takes
olfactory experiences to represent are not identical to the properties they in fact
represent, which means that the physicalist view is false.
Similar arguments can be used to argue against the relationalist view of
the properties represented by olfactory experiences. According to relationalism,
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olfactory properties are relational properties, and minds, subjects, organisms,
or states of minds, subjects, or organisms are one of the relata. The problem is
that introspective and epistemological considerations suggest against taking the
properties represented by olfactory experiences to be such relational properties.
When we introspect upon olfactory experiences, we seem to experience every-
day objects or bare olfactory objects (“smells”) themselves as having olfactory
properties independently of us. We do not experience olfactory properties as
somehow attaching to both us (or something to do with us) and external olfac-
tory objects, which might be everyday objects or bare olfactory objects. Indeed,
on the relational view, olfactory experiences represent at least two objects: us
or something to do with us and external olfactory objects. But there is little
introspective reason to think that we or something to do with us are objects of
olfactory experience.
Epistemological considerations also suggest against the view: from olfactory
experience alone, we are not justified in drawing conclusions about our relations
to external olfactory objects. Of course, from your olfactory experiences, you
might infer that you have olfactory experiences, and from this and the belief
that external olfactory objects cause your olfactory experiences, you can infer
that your olfactory experiences are causally related to external olfactory objects.
So perhaps olfactory experiences do play a role in justifying beliefs about our
relations to olfactory objects. However, your belief about your relation to external
olfactory objects is not justified by your olfactory experience alone in the way
that would be predicted by the relational view. It is justified by a combination
of (perhaps your knowledge of) the fact that you have an olfactory experience,
regardless of its content, together with an auxiliary belief about the causes of
olfactory experiences. But if the relational view were true, such conclusions
should (also) be justified by the contents of olfactory experiences. Olfactory
experiences should “say” that you are related to external olfactory objects in
such-and-such ways, and this should justify your conclusion that you are thus
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related to them.
The above discussion shows that the relational view clearly makes an error
of commission: it includes in the content of olfactory experiences material that
should not be included. It is less clear, however, that it makes an error of
omission. Whether it does depends on whether, say, the sweet, tangy, and
orangey smell that we experience when we smell an orange can be found in
the relational contents attributed by the relationalist. This will depend on the
particular relationalist view. On a relationalist view on which the relational
contents are, say, dispositions to cause behavioral reactions in us, it is doubtful
that anything in the picture can capture the sweet, tangy, and orangey smell we
experience, and the view will make an error of omission. But a relationalist view
taking the relevant contents to be dispositions to cause phenomenal experiences
in us might plausibly capture the sweet, tangy, and orangey smell in the relevant
phenomenal experiences, so it avoids an error of omission. Such a view still
faces the problem of commission, however, since the extra relational material it
includes in its account of olfactory properties does not match the contents we
have introspective and epistemological reasons to ascribe. It is also not clear
what would motivate such a view over the primitivist alternative described in
what follows, other than the desire to avoid the error theory that (as we will
see) primitivism leads to. As we will see in the next section, it is not clear that
there is good reason to reject such an error theory.
Unlike physicalism and relationalism, primitivism does not face the mismatch
problem. Primitivism takes olfactory experience at face value, taking the prop-
erties represented by olfactory experiences to be just what they appear to be
and not something else: properties like the sweet, tangy, and orangey smell we
experience when we sniff the halved orange. These primitive olfactory properties
are sui generis (not reducible to non-olfactory properties), categorical (not dis-
positional), non-relational, and non-mental properties. These are the contents
revealed by introspection of olfactory experiences. These are also the contents
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that justify inferences based on olfactory experiences. From an experience of a
halved orange as having a sweet, tangy, and orangey smell, we justifiably infer
that the halved orange has a sweet, tangy, and orangey smell. The property
the inferred belief ascribes to the halved orange is a sui generis, categorical,
non-relational, and non-mental property.5
One key objection to these arguments is that olfactory experiences represent
their contents in special ways that make these contents introspectively inaccessible
and block our using them to draw content-appropriate inferences.6 For instance,
perhaps olfactory experiences represent their contents under special guises or
special modes of presentation. When we introspect upon them, what we notice
are these modes of presentation, not their contents. And when we draw an
inference from them, what we base our inference on is the modes of presentation,
not the contents. For example, one might say that an olfactory experience of a
halved orange represents the halved orange as having a physical property but
that it does so under a special “sweet, tangy, and orangey” mode of presentation,
which is what we introspect upon and reason upon.
One problem with this proposal is that it risks making it unmotivated to
attribute contents to olfactory experiences. Recall that the key reasons to take
olfactory experiences to have contents were introspective and epistemological
reasons (see section 2). We introspectively notice that olfactory experiences “say”
something, and olfactory experiences play certain roles in justifying inferences.
If modes of presentation do all the work in accounting for what is introspectively
accessible and in licensing inferences, then there is little motivation for taking
olfactory experiences to also have contents. Indeed, it seems that on this
picture, modes of presentation play the role of contents (see our definition of
5Perkins (1983) defends a related projectivist view of olfactory experiences, on which they
represent properties of experiences that we mistakenly project onto the world. While such a
view avoids the mismatch problem, it is unnecessarily stronger than the alternative primitivist
view I am defending in that it requires that olfactory properties be instantiated in the mind,
whereas the primitivist view I am defending allows that they are represented whether or not
they are instantiated anywhere.
6I consider these and other objections to the mismatch problem in greater detail in Mende-
lovici 2018a, Ch. 3.
15
“intentionality” in section 2), so they would simply be contents (and, for the
reasons discussed above, they would have to be primitivist contents), and there
would be little reason to ascribe any additional contents that physicalism or
relationalism are true of to olfactory experiences.7
We are considering the objection that olfactory experiences represent their
contents in special ways that make them introspectively inaccessible and that
block our using them to draw content-appropriate inferences. Another version
of this objection takes olfactory experiences to represent olfactory properties
nonconceptually, that is, in a way that does not require having any concepts. Per-
haps nonconceptually represented contents cannot be discerned by introspection
and cannot license inferences to beliefs with conceptually represented contents,
even when the conceptually and nonconceptually represented contents are the
same.
One problem with this suggestion is that it is not generally true that non-
conceptual contents cannot be discerned by introspection or that they cannot
justify inferences to conceptually represented contents. Visual experiences of
shapes represent particular shapes nonconceptually, since we needn’t have shape
concepts in order to have them. But visual shape experiences are accessible
to introspection. We can tell from introspection that a particular visual shape
experience represents a circular shape rather than a square shape. And visual
shape experiences can justify beliefs about shapes, which presumably involve con-
ceptual representations of shapes. For example, from a visual shape experience
of a square before you, you might justifiably infer that there is a square before
you. In order for the nonconceptual content reply to help the physicalist or
relationalist about olfactory properties, there would need to be a special reason
to think that nonconceptual contents prevent olfactory properties from being
discernable to introspection and from licensing inferences to related beliefs.
7This does not mean, of course, that there would not be reasons to ascribe distinct referents
to olfactory experiences, where referents are the external items that contents pick out. However,
it is not clear that the referents would be physical or relational properties either, unless we
allow an intentional state’s referents to be determined wholly independently of its contents.
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There’s another problem with the suggestion relying on nonconceptual repre-
sentation: It is arguably a datum that olfactory experiences have contents that
are introspectable and that play a role in justifying conceptual states, such as
beliefs (see section 2). Even if we accept some “hidden” nonconceptual physicalist
or relationalist contents, we should also accept primitivist contents. But then it
is unclear why we should also accept the “hidden” physicalist or relationalist
contents at all.
4 False Olfactory Experiences, True Beliefs
I have argued that olfactory experiences represent everyday objects or bare
olfactory objects as having primitive olfactory properties. In this section, I will
argue that olfactory experiences reliably misrepresent: they get things wrong
in the same way all the time.8 This might be thought to prevent them from
justifying true beliefs about the properties of apparently smelly objects, but I
will argue that it does not.
Presumably, the primitive olfactory properties represented by olfactory expe-
riences are never instantiated in the actual world. The halved orange doesn’t
really have a sweet, tangy, orangey smell. Instead, it has certain physical prop-
erties and certain dispositions to affect us in certain ways. So our olfactory
experiences generally misrepresent. The result is an error theory, one on which
olfactory experiences generally misrepresent the world around us.
One might worry that an error theory is incompatible with the role that
olfactory experiences play in justifying beliefs about the sources of smells, which
often turn out to be true. For example, suppose I take a whiff of a halved orange
and experience a sweet, tangy, and orangey smell. From this olfactory experience,
I might truly and justifiably conclude that the orange is ripe. Similarly, I might
smell a smoky, cigarette-y smell. From this experience, I might truly and
justifiably conclude that someone is smoking nearby. I want to suggest that an
8See Mendelovici 2013c, 2016, and 2018a for related discussion of reliable misrepresentation.
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error theory about olfactory experience is perfectly compatible with such cases
in which we use our olfactory experiences to make true and justified inferences.
The key point is that although olfactory experiences misrepresent, they
reliably misrepresent, in that they misrepresent in the same way in similar
circumstances. When presented with a halved orange with particular molecular
properties on multiple occasions, we misrepresent it as having the same sweet,
tangy, orangey smell each time. The fact that olfactory experiences reliably
misrepresent explains why they are so useful despite being false.
As I’ve argued elsewhere (Mendelovici 2013c), mental states that reliably
misrepresent can nonetheless help us perform various cognitive tasks. This is
also true specifically of olfactory experiences. For instance, olfactory experiences
that reliably misrepresent can help us discriminate between different kinds of
items. We can tell the difference between fresh and sour milk on the basis of
our olfactory experiences alone, even though we misrepresent both fresh and
sour milk samples as having olfactory properties they do not have. Olfactory
experiences that reliably misrepresent can also help us identify particular objects
or kinds of objects. For example, on the basis of our olfactory experiences alone,
we might be able to tell that there’s butter chicken cooking in the kitchen, even
though we misrepresent the butter chicken as having olfactory properties it does
not have. Similarly, a father might correctly identify his newborn baby on the
basis of smell alone, even though he reliably misrepresents her as having olfactory
properties she does not in fact have. Mere reliability, even in the absence of
veridicality, is useful for many tasks.9
The above examples also show that olfactory experiences that reliably mis-
represent can lead us to true conclusions. Your false olfactory experience of a
glass of milk might nonetheless cause true beliefs about whether the milk is fresh
9This provides a response to arguments against error theories on the basis of the general
well-functioning of our olfactory systems. Batty writes: “Widespread error on the part of
the olfactory system does not accord with its being a functioning olfactory system and this
is a consequence we ought to avoid both for intra- and inter-species considerations.” (Batty
2010b, p. 1153) However, as we’ve seen, when accompanied by reliability, widespread error
does accord with the general well-functioning of the olfactory system.
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or sour. Your false experience of that characteristic butter chicken smell allows
you to correctly infer that butter chicken is cooking in the kitchen.
This does not yet show that inferences involving mental states that reliably
misrepresent are ever justified. Even if your olfactory experience of an orange
as sweet, tangy, and orangey causes you to truly believe that the orange is
ripe, this is not enough to conclude that the inference is justified. After all, not
every true inference we make or are disposed to make is justified. And in the
case of olfactory experiences, there is special reason to think that the relevant
inferences might not be justified: the inference’s premises do not seem to support
its conclusion. It seems we are reasoning as follows:
P1. The orange is sweet, tangy, and orangey. (content of olfactory experience,
false)
C. The orange is ripe. (content of belief, true)
The problem is that an orange’s having a particular primitive olfactory property
does not entail or make it more likely to be true that the orange is ripe. Now,
I want to acknowledge that in some cases, we might be making inferences like
these, and that in such cases, our inferences are not justified, even though our
conclusions might be true. But I also want to suggest that in other cases, there is
an implicit bridge premise in our reasoning that, together with the content of the
olfactory experience, justifies our conclusion. This implicit bridge premise links
the olfactory properties that our olfactory experience ascribes to its object (like
that of having a sweet, tangy, and orangey smell) to the non-olfactory properties
our conclusion ascribes to the object (like that of being ripe). In the case of our
inference based on the olfactory experience of the halved orange, our reasoning
might go like this:
P1. The orange is sweet, tangy, and orangey. (content of olfactory experience,
false)
P2. Oranges that are sweet, tangy, and orangey are likely to be ripe. (content
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of implicit bridge premise)
C. Therefore, the orange is ripe. (content of belief, true)
P2 is our implicit bridge premise. From P1 and P2, we can justifiably infer C,
since P1 and P2 together make C more likely to be true. If we do in fact at least
implicitly accept such bridge premises, false olfactory experiences can indeed
help justify true related beliefs.10
It is not implausible that we do accept such premises in many cases. Someone
who infers C from P1 is likely to at least implicitly believe P2. She likely takes
the sweet, tangy, and orangey smell to be a sign of an orange’s being ripe, and
this is likely to be because she takes it to be a general truth that oranges that
are sweet, tangy, and orangey are ripe. It is not hard to see how we might come
to have beliefs like P2 and how these beliefs might come to be justified: since
olfactory experiences reliably misrepresent, we are likely to be confronted with
strong inductive evidence that sweet-, tangy-, and orangey-smelling oranges are
ripe and little disconfirming evidence. Every sweet, tangy, and orangey orange
we seem to encounter is ripe, and no unripe oranges we encounter are sweet,
tangy, and orangey. And, so, we might justifiably come to believe that oranges
that are sweet, tangy, and orangey are ripe.
If we understand P2 as stating that all or most oranges that are sweet, tangy,
and orangely are likely to be ripe, it is trivially true, since there are no oranges
that have the relevant olfactory properties. But if we understand P2 as stating a
counterfactual-supporting law, such that its truth would require that any actual
or possible oranges that are sweet, tangy, and orangey are likely to be ripe,
then it is most likely false. There is no reason to think that merely possible
oranges with the relevant primitive olfactory properties would be more likely
to be ripe than oranges without these properties. For our purposes, it doesn’t
10In Mendelovici 2018a, Ch. 7, I argue that thoughts generally originally represent different
contents than experiences, though they can derivatively represent many of the same contents
thanks to their relations to experiences. If this is right, then the contents <sweet, tangy, and
orangey> and <smokey and cigarette-y> are originally represented in P1, but derivatively
represented in P2. See also Mendelovici 2019 for a condensed discussion of the view.
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matter which implicit belief we are most likely to have in such cases, since either
way of understanding P2 would allow it to help P1 justify C.
Olfactory experiences representing bare olfactory objects can similarly justify
related beliefs. Suppose you notice a smoky, cigarette-y smell, but do not
experience it as attaching to any everyday object. We might reason to the
conclusion that someone is smoking nearby as follows:
S1. There is a smokey and cigarette-y smell located around here. (Content of
olfactory experience, false)
S2. When there is a smokey and cigarette-y smell at a location, it is likely that
there is someone smoking near that location. (Content of implicit bridge
premise)
SC. Therefore, someone is smoking near here. (ontent of belief, true)
It is likely that someone who infers SC from S1 at least implicitly believes S2.
Again, S2 is either trivially true or false, since, strictly speaking, there are no
smokey, cigarette-y smells. But S2 nonetheless helps S1 justify the true belief,
SC.
I have argued that even though olfactory experiences misrepresent, they can
lead us to true and justified beliefs about the sources of smells. Since they
reliably misrepresent, they can lead us to true beliefs about the sources of smells,
and since we sometimes at least implicitly accept bridge premises like P2 and
S2, many of these beliefs are justified.
5 Conclusion
I have argued that olfactory experiences represent everyday objects or bare
olfactory objects as having primitive olfactory properties, which they do not in
fact have. Olfactory experiences misrepresent, but since they tend to misrepresent
in the same way on multiple occasions, they reliably misrepresent, which explains
how they can be useful and lead to true and justified beliefs.
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It is sometimes thought that since perception is useful in helping us get
by in the world and acquire true and justified beliefs, it is generally veridical.
This kind of reasoning can lead us to reject error theories of various kinds of
perceptual experiences, which might otherwise be well motivated. But we’ve
seen that experiences that don’t just merely misrepresent, but instead reliably
misrepresent, can be useful and help us acquire related true and justified beliefs.
If what is true of olfactory experience is true of many other types of experiences,
as I’ve argued elsewhere (Mendelovici 2018a, Ch. 3, 2013b, 2013a), this suggests
a picture of perception on which perception provides us a model of the world
that is largely non-veridical but that corresponds in a systematic way to how
things actually are and that can be used to successfully guide our behavior and
draw true and justified inferences about the world. For most practical purposes,
being reliably wrong is just as good as being right.
References
Batty, C. (2009). What’s that smell? Southern Journal of Philosophy, 47(4):321–
348.
Batty, C. (2010a). Olfactory experience I: The content of olfactory experience.
Philosophy Compass, 5(12):1137–1146.
Batty, C. (2010b). Olfactory experience II: Objects and properties. Philosophy
Compass, 5(12):1147–1156.
Batty, C. (2010c). A representational account of olfactory experience. Canadian
Journal of Philosophy, 40(4):511–538.
Batty, C. (2010d). What the nose doesn’t know: Non-veridicality and olfactory
experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 17(3-4):10–17.
Batty, C. (2011). Smelling lessons. Philosophical Studies, 153(Mar.):161–174.
Bourget, D. (2015). Representationalism, perceptual distortion and the limits of
phenomenal concepts. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 45(1):16–36.
Bourget, D. (2017a). Representationalism and sensory modalities: an argument
for inter-modal representationalism. American Philosophical Quarterly, 54.
Bourget, D. (2017b). Why are some phenomenal experiences ‘vivid’ and others
‘faint’? representationalism, imagery, and cognitive phenomenology. Aus-
tralasian Journal of Philosophy, 95(4):673–687.
22
Bourget, D. and Mendelovici, A. (2014). Tracking representationalism. In Bailey,
A., editor, Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers, pages 209–235. Continuum.
Budek, T. and Farkas, K. (2014). Which causes of an experience are also objects
of the experience? In Brogaard, B., editor, Does Perception Have Content?,
pages 351–370. Oxford University Press.
Cavedon-Taylor, D. (forthcoming). Odors, objects and olfaction. American
Philosophical Quarterly.
Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge.
Harman, G. (1990). The intrinsic quality of experience. Philosophical Perspectives,
4:31–52.
Kriegel, U. (2011). The Sources of Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
Lycan, W. (1996). Consciousness and Experience. MIT Press, Bradford Books,
Cambridge.
Lycan, W. (2000). The slighting of smell. In Bhushan, N. and Rosenfeld, S.,
editors, Of Minds and Molecules: New Philosophical Perspectives on Chemistry,
pages 273–289. New York: Oxford University Press.
Marr, D. (1982). Vision. Freeman.
Matthen, M. (2005). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of
Sense Perception. Oxford University Press UK.
McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Mendelovici, A. (2010). Mental Representation and Closely Conflated Topics.
PhD thesis, Princeton University.
Mendelovici, A. (2013a). Intentionalism about moods. Thought: A Journal of
Philosophy, 2(1):126–136.
Mendelovici, A. (2013b). Pure intentionalism about moods and emotions. In
Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind, pages 135–157. Routledge, New
York, NY.
Mendelovici, A. (2013c). Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of
mental representation. Philosophical Studies, 165(2):421–443.
Mendelovici, A. (2016). Why tracking theories should allow for clean cases of
reliable misrepresentation. Disputatio, 8(42):57–92.
Mendelovici, A. (2018a). The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality. Oxford
University Press.
Mendelovici, A. (2018b). Propositionalism without propositions, objectual-
ism without objects. In Grzankowski, A. and Montague, M., editors, Non-
proposiitonal intentionality. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
Mendelovici, A. (2019). Immediate and reflective senses. In Shottenkirk, D.,
Curado, M., and Gouveia, S., editors, Perception, Cognition, and Aesthetics,
pages 187–209. New York: Routledge.
23
Mendelovici, A. (MS). The objects of olfactory experience.
Mendelovici, A. and Bourget, D. (2019). Review of Karen Neander’s A Mark of
the Mental. Philosophical Review, 128(3):378–385.
Mendelovici, A. and Bourget, D. (forthcominga). Consciousness and intentionality.
In Kriegel, U., editor, Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness.
Oxford University Press.
Mendelovici, A. and Bourget, D. (forthcomingb). Kolors without colors, repre-
sentation without intentionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Mizrahi, V. (2014). Sniff, smell, and stuff. Philosophical Studies, 171(2):233–250.
Neander, K. (2017). A Mark of the Mental: A Defence of Informational Teleose-
mantics. Cambridge, USA: MIT Press.
Pautz, A. (2006). Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: an empirical
argument against externalist intentionalism. Noûs, 40(2):205–240.
Pautz, A. (2013). The real trouble for phenomenal externalists: New empirical
evidence for a brain-based theory of consciousness. In Brown, R., editor,
Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature
of Experience, pages 237–298. Springer.
Peacocke, C. (1983). Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and their Relations.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Perkins, M. (1983). Sensing The World. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Reid, T. (1785/2002). Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Pennsylvania
State University Press, University Park.
Richardson, L. (2013). Sniffing and smelling. Philosophical Studies, 162(2):401–
419.
Roberts, T. (2015). A breath of fresh air: Absence and the structure of olfactory
perception. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 96(3):n/a–n/a.
Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press, Cambridge.
24
